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Abstract 
Many studies of social interaction have incorporated the nature of social value orientations 
(pro-social vs. pro-self) as an important factor.  This paper extends this literature by 
showing that the effect of the nature of social value orientations is moderated by the 
consistency of social value orientations (high vs. low).  In three studies, we examined this 
moderating influence.  In Study 1,  we investigated the temporal stability of social value 
orientations and found that high consistent orientations are more stable than low consistent 
orientations.  In Studies 2 and 3, we found evidence for the moderating impact of 
consistency of social value orientations on reciprocal cooperation and forgiveness.  High 
consistent individuals were more likely to follow the nature of their social value orientation 
than low consistent individuals. 
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Exploring the Role of Consistency of Social Value Orientations: Temporal Stability, 
Reciprocal Cooperation, and Forgiveness 
Current social psychological theorizing no longer departs from the assumption that 
self-interested motivations, such as tendencies toward enhancing one's personal outcomes 
either in an absolute sense (individualism) or in a relative sense (competition), are the sole 
orientations that people adopt in social interaction (Van Lange, 2000).  Interpersonal 
orientations may also reflect tendencies toward enhancing joint outcomes (cooperation), 
enhancing equality in outcomes (equality), or enhancing other's outcomes (altruism).  All 
these tendencies are often referred to as social value orientations, or preferences for 
particular patterns of distributions of outcomes for self and others (Messick & McClintock, 
1968).  Research on the nature of social value orientations often dichotomizes these 
tendencies into two broad categories: (1) a pro-social orientation (including cooperation, 
equality, altruism; see Van Lange, 1999, for an integrated analysis) and (2) a pro-self 
orientation (including individualism and competition; see Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). 
In addition, individuals also differ according the consistency in the choice pattern 
with which the nature of social value orientations is measured (Liebrand, 1984). 
Individuals with a high consistent orientation have a clear-cut decision preference or 
orientation, whereas individuals with a low consistent orientation do not (yet) have a clearly 
developed orientation.  Hertel & Fiedler (1998) argued that high consistent orientations 
might reflect stronger dispositions than low consistent orientations.  Therefore, any effects 
of the nature of social value orientations on cooperative behavior should be much stronger 
for individuals with a high consistent orientation than for individuals with a low consistent 
orientation.  High consistent individuals are expected to behave mostly in close 
correspondence with the nature of their social value orientation (and with its associated 
cognitions and perceptions) in different situations.  Cooperative behavior by low consistent 
individuals should rather be subject to situational influences (e.g., by default norms 
associated with particular situations, Hertel &  Fiedler, 1998).  Hitherto, the literature on 
social value orientations has paid only marginal attention to the role of consistency of social 
value orientations. Consistency of Social Value Orientations  4 
Smeesters, Warlop, Van Avermaet, Comeille, & Yzerbyt (2002) however have 
argued that consistency of social value orientations might moderate the impact of the nature 
of social value orientations in social interaction.  This paper wants to make a significant 
contribution towards demonstrating this moderating role of consistency of social value 
orientations.  The aim of our paper was twofold.  First of all, we wanted to examine the 
assumption of Hertel & Fiedler (1998) that high consistent orientations reflect stronger 
dispositions than low consistent orientations by examining the temporal stability of high 
versus low consistent social value orientations (Study 1).  Second, in two other studies we 
wanted to explore the moderating impact of consistency of social value orientations on 
cooperative behavior in two types of social interactions: one in which participants played 
against highly cooperative others (Study 2) and one in which they played against highly 
defective others (Study 3). 
Social Value Orientations 
Kelley & Thibaut's (1978) interdependence theory assumes that decision-making in 
a mixed-motive situation starts from a given matrix, which represents individualistic 
preferences.  Individuals following this given matrix are dominated by a self-interested 
principle and only place value on their own outcomes.  However, people may also place 
value on the outcomes of others.  These individuals adopt broader preferences than self-
interested individuals.  In general, these preferences for specific self/other outcomes 
distributions are often called social value orientations (Messick & McClintock, 1968). 
As stated earlier, the most commonly studied orientations are the pro-social 
orientation and the pro-self orientation.  A large stream of research demonstrated that pro-
socials behave more cooperatively than pro-selfs in various kinds of social interactions 
(e.g., De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Kuhlman & 
Marshello, 1975; Van Vugt, Meertens, & Van Lange, 1995).  In interaction with other 
individuals, pro-socials often tend to rely on a 'behavioral assimilation' principle (Kelley & 
Stahelski, 1970): pro-socials cooperate as long as they expect that other individuals are also 
willing to cooperate but tum to non-cooperative behavior when the others fail to cooperate. 
Pro-selfs mostly behave non-cooperatively, even in interaction with cooperative others. 
However, a few studies (e.g., Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange & Semin-Consistency of Social Value Orientations  5 
Goossens, 1998) demonstrated that pro-selfs were more likely to resist the temptation to 
exploit cooperative others when these persons' cooperation was due to a moral personality. 
Consistency of social value orientations 
A recent study by Smeesters et al. (2002) argued that cooperative behavior might 
also be influenced by individual differences in consistency of social value orientations (see 
also Hertel & Fiedler, 1998).  They used the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 
1984) to measure social value orientations.  This is a computerized task presenting 24 
choice trials, with each trial consisting of two different distributions of outcomes for self 
versus another person.  Besides information about the nature of social value orientations 
(pro-social, pro-self), the Ring Measure also provides information about the decisional 
consistency of an individual's social value orientation.  A maximal consistency score on the 
Ring Measure implies that the participant's preferred social value orientation remains 
consistent across all trials (i.e., s/he chooses all distributions of self/other outcomes 
consistent with his/her own social value orientation, Liebrand, 1984).  The consistency 
score on the Ring Measure will decrease when individuals choose according another 
orientation on some trials.  Hertel & Fiedler (1998) interpreted consistency in tenns of a 
clear-cut decision strategy or orientation.  Individuals with high consistency scores should 
be more certain in their decisions over trials than individuals with low consistency scoresl . 
They also found that consistency was positively correlated with the extremeness of a pretest 
measure.  This pretest consisted of four sample trials designed to provide a rough baseline 
estimate of social value orientation prior to the experiment.  Hertel & Fiedler (1998) argued 
that the extremeness of this pretest value reflected a clear-cut strategy, which suggested that 
a clear-cut preformed strategy is an essential ingredient for consistency. 
Hertel &  Fiedler (1998) also argued that these high consistent orientations reflect 
strong dispositions, which should be stable over time and of which the (pro-social or pro-
self) nature should not become modified easily when confronted with different situational 
influences.  Therefore, cooperative behavior of high consistent individuals should follow 
the nature of their social value orientation.  The nature of a specific social value orientation 
includes all cognitions and perceptions associated with it. Consistency of Social Value Orientations  6 
Low consistent orientations are assumed to be weakly developed orientations 
(Hertel & Fiedler, 1998),  Although these orientations are also either pro-social or pro-self 
by nature, it is assumed that they only playa strong role in ambiguous situations (i.e" 
situations with no relevant features guiding cooperative behavior) (Smeesters et aI., 2002). 
In ambiguous situations, low consistent pro-socials are expected to behave more 
cooperatively than low consistent pro-selfs.  However, the influences of low consistent 
orientations on cooperative behavior should be substantially weaker in unambiguous 
situations (i.e., situations with relevant situational features such as information about the 
personality of the interaction partner).  According to Hertel & Fiedler (1998), low 
consistent orientations are not strong enough to resist situational influences.  They argued 
that cooperative behavior of low consistent individuals in situations with relevant features 
might be determined by default norms associated with these situational features.  High 
consistent individuals should be less inclined to follow these default norms but instead 
follow their own idiosyncratic norms determined by the nature of their own social value 
orientation. 
Smeesters et al. (2002) measured both the nature and the consistency of social value 
orientations, before participants played a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma game against an 
anonymous partner.  They also primed their participants unobtrusively, which affected the 
expectations about the other player(s) in the game.  They found that all individuals behaved 
very selfishly when they expected to play against a presumed non-cooperative, mighty 
partner.  However, when they thought they were playing against a cooperative, moral 
partner, all participants except high consistent pro-selfs behaved cooperatively.  The latter 
exploited their partners, whom they believed to be very cooperative.  Building upon the 
assumptions of Hertel & Fiedler (1998), the observed behavioral responses of high 
consistent pro-socials (behavioral assimilation) and high consistent pro-selfs (selfish 
behavior) are determined by the pro-social or pro-self nature of their social value 
orientation.  This is congruent with previous models of social value orientations (see Van 
Lange, 1999).  According Hertel & Fiedler (1998), the observed behavioral responses of 
low consistent individuals (also behavioral assimilation) are assumed to reflect situational 
influences rather than a clear-cut decision routine or orientation.  The direction of their 
behavioral responses might be determined by the default social norm associated with a Consistency of Social Value Orientations  7 
particular situation.  For instance, when playing against a moral, cooperative person, 
reciprocal cooperative behavior is normative or desirable.  When playing against a mighty, 
non-cooperative person, the default norm is to protect oneself by behaving non-
cooperatively as well. 
The present research 
In this paper, we wanted to extend the very limited knowledge about consistency of 
social value orientations in two ways.  First of all, in Study 1 we wanted to find additional 
evidence for Hertel & Fiedler's (1998) claim, that high consistent orientations reflect 
stronger dispositions than low consistent orientations, by demonstrating that high consistent 
orientations should be more stable over time than low consistent orientations.  We also 
expected individuals with low consistent orientations to adopt variable orientations over 
time more easily than high consistent individuals.  Second, we wanted to examine whether 
the influence of the (pro-social or pro-self) nature of social value orientations on 
cooperative behavior is stronger for high consistent individuals than for low consistent 
individuals.  In studies 2 and 3, the impact of consistency of social value orientations was 
examined in two kinds of social interaction: a situation that could elicit reciprocal 
cooperation (Study 2) and a situation that could elicit forgiveness (Study 3).  In general, we 
expected reciprocal cooperation and forgiveness to be more prevalent among high 
consistent pro-socials and to be least prevalent among high consistent pro-selfs, because of 
the pursuit of, respectively, a pro-social and pro-self orientation.  We expected low 
consistent individuals to behave somewhere in between. 
Study 1: Temporal Stability of Social Value Orientations 
The temporal stability of high versus low consistent social value orientations has 
never been investigated.  Van Lange (1999; Study 1) conducted a test-retest reliability 
study in which he measured social value orientations at two points in time (with a time lag 
of nineteen months) but in which consistency was not taken into account.  The temporal 
stability of social value orientations was measured via a test-retest reliability score of social 
value orientations.  He found a significant relationship between time 1 and time 2 Consistency of Social Value Orientations  8 
classifications of social value orientations.  In his study, 342 of 582 participants (58.8%) 
expressed the same orientations at time 1 and time 2.  Van Lange (2000) concluded that 
"the stability of interpersonal orientation is somewhat lower than one would expect from a 
stable dispositional point of view, yet comparable to that found for other individual 
difference variables, which are argued to be relatively stable" (pp. 321). 
However, as indicated earlier Hertel & Fiedler (1998) argued that high consistent 
orientations reflect stronger individual dispositions than low consistent orientations. 
Therefore, we expected the temporal stability of high consistent orientations to be 
substantially higher than that of low consistent orientations as indicated by the test-retest 
reliability of high versus low consistent orientations (cf. Van Lange).  We conducted Study 
1 to test this assumption.  Compared to the study of Van Lange (1999), there were some 
procedural differences.  First of all, Van Lange (1999) used the Triple-Dominance Measure 
of Social Values (see Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997) to assess social value 
orientations.  This test in his study consisted of six decomposed games.  Each decomposed 
game consisted of three different distributions of points for the self and for another person 
(i.e., a cooperative distribution, an individualistic distribution, and a competitive 
distribution).  Because this test did not have many items, it was not really designed for 
measuring consistency.  Therefore, we used the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 
1984), which consists of twenty-four different distributions of money for the self and for 
another person.  Second, in our study the time lag was six months instead of a time lag of 
nineteen months as in Van Lange (1999). 
Participants 
A total of 382 students participated at Time 1 for partial fulfillment of course 
requirements.  Six months later, 285 of these 382 students participated at Time 2.  Only 
students participating in both sessions were retained for the analysis. Consistency of Social Value Orientations  9 
Ring Measure of Social Values 
At Time 1 and Time 2, we measured the nature and consistency of social value 
orientations of each participant using the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 1984; 
Liebrand & McClintock, 1988).  The Ring Measure is a computerized task that confronts 
participants with 24 decomposed games, each presenting a choice between two different 
money distributions among the self and an imaginary other person.  Pay-offs for the self 
and for the other can be either positive or negative. An example of a pair is the choice 
between Alternative A: Bef. 1450 for the self and Bef. -390 for the other and Alternative B: 
Bef. 1300 for the self and Bef. -750 for the other2.  The 24 pairs of outcomes were sampled 
from a circle in the own/other outcome plane defined by two orthogonal dimensions: a 
horizontal dimension representing the outcomes for the self and a vertical dimension 
representing the outcomes for the other person.  Specific own/other outcomes are defined as 
points in the plane.  The center of the circle coincides with the origin of the outcome plane, 
i.e., the origin denotes Bef. 0 for the self and Bef. 0 for the other.  The radius of the circle is 
Bef. 1500.  Each pair consists of two equidistant own/other outcome distributions that are 
located next to each other on the circle.  For each of the 24 pairs, participants were 
instructed to choose their most preferred alternative. 
After the participants have made all their 24 choices, we calculated the total 
amount of money allocated to the self and to the other. These two totals can be represented 
as coordinates on the horizontal and vertical axis, defining a single point in the plane.  This 
point provides an estimate of the direction of the participant's orientation vector in the 
outcome plane.  This vector represents the participant's social value orientation.  Each 
orientation reflects a unique pattern of choices.  Participants are classified on the Ring 
Measure as making choices consistent with one of the orientations.  Participants with 
orientation vectors falling between 22.5° and 112.5° are classified as pro-social, 
participants with orientation vectors falling between 22.5° and 292.5° (or -67.5°) as pro-
self. 
Of the 285 participants at Time 1,  136 could be identified as pro-social and 127 
could be identified as pro-self.  Seventeen participants could not be identified because they 
had an orientation vector of exactly 22.5°.  Five participants were also not classified 
because they had a consistency that was lower than 60%.  This is in accordance with Consistency of Social Value Orientations  10 
Liebrand (1984) and Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre (1986) who included only those 
orientation vectors exceeding 60% of the maximal length as reliable indicators of social 
value orientations.  We then classified the remaining 263 participants as high or low in 
consistency of their social value orientation by using a median split.  As a consequence, we 
had 71 high consistent pro-socials, 65 low consistent pro-socials, 66 high consistent pro-
selfs, and 61  low consistent pro-selfs3 at Time 1. 
At Time 2, we classified participants according the same criteria.  We classified 73 
participants as high consistent pro-socials, 66 as low consistent pro-socials, 61  as high 
consistent pro-selfs, 56 as low consistent pro-selfs.  Twenty-one participants could not be 
classified because they had an orientation vector of exactly 22.5°.  Eight participants were 
not classified because they exhibited a consistency that was lower than 60%. 
Results 
We found that 183 out of 263 classifiable participants (69.6%) at Time 1 expressed 
the same orientation at Time 2, indicating a relatively strong correspondence between Time 
1 and Time 2 classifications (X2 [12, N =  263] =  399.85, p < .0001; Gamma =  0.61, p < 
.0001).  Furthermore, 120 out of 137 participants with a high consistent orientation at Time 
1 (87.6%) expressed the same orientation at Time 2, indicating a very strong 
correspondence between Time 1 and Time 2 classification (X2  [4, N = 137] = 129.72, P < 
.0001; Gamma =  0.97, p < .0001).  Out of 71  high consistent pro-socials at Time 1,64 
(90.1 %) had the same orientation at Time 2.  Out of 66 high consistent pro-selfs at Time 1, 
56 (84.8%) had the same orientation at Time 2.  Of the participants with a low consistent 
orientation at Time 1, 63 out of 126 (50%) expressed the same orientation at Time 2, 
indicating a significant but weaker correspondence between Time 1 and Time 2 
classifications (X2 [12, N =  126] =  17.73, P < .05; Gamma =  0.23, p < .05).  More 
specifically, 31  out of 65 low consistent pro-socials at Time 1 (47.7%) had the same 
orientation at Time 2.  Thirty-two out of 61 low consistent pro-selfs at Time 1 (52.4%) 
expressed the same orientation at Time 2.  Table 1 represents these percentages. 
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Table 1 also shows which new orientation participants adopted when changing their 
orientation from Time 1 to Time 2.  Of the high consistent pro-socials at Time 1, 8.4% 
adopted a low consistent pro-social orientation at Time 2.  Of the low consistent pro-socials 
at Time 1,9.2% adopted a high consistent pro-social orientation and 29.2% ofthem 
adopted a low consistent pro-self orientation at Time 2.  Of the high consistent pro-selfs at 
Time 1,  1.5% adopted a low consistent pro-social orientation and 6.0% adopted a low 
consistent pro-self orientation at Time 2.  Finally, of the low consistent pro-selfs at Time 1, 
36.1 % adopted a low consistent pro-social orientation and 6.6% adopted a high consistent 
pro-self orientation at Time 2. 
Discussion 
The results clearly indicated that the temporal stability of high consistent 
orientations is much higher than that of low consistent orientations, as measured by the test-
retest reliability scores of high versus low consistent social value orientations. 
Correspondence of Time 1 and Time 2 classifications of social value orientations was much 
higher for high consistent individuals than for low consistent individuals (87.6% vs. 50%). 
The overall stability in our study was higher than in the study of Van Lange (1999) (69.6% 
vs.  58.8%).  A variety of reasons may be responsible.  Obviously, the differences in 
temporal stability between the two studies might be attributed to the different measures 
used, namely the Triple-Dominance Measure of Social Values in the study of Van Lange 
(1999) and the Ring Measure of Social Values in our study.  Second, differences in the 
composition of the samples used may also have had an influence.  We used a student 
sample, whereas Van Lange (1999) used a sample of individuals who were representative 
for the Dutch adult population.  Third, in our study the social value orientation measure at 
Time 1 as well as at Time 2 was administered as the first of a series of questionnaires.  In 
the study of Van Lange (1999), the social value orientation measure at Time 2 was 
preceded by other questionnaires.  The results may therefore reflect tiredness or 
unforeseeable carryover effects from these preceding questionnaires.  Finally, the time lag 
between the two measures was shorter in our study than in the study of Van Lange (1999) 
(6 months vs.  19 months).  It is reasonable to assume that temporal stability may decrease Consistency of Social Value Orientations  12 
with longer time lags.  Future research might examine whether this decrease is the same for 
high and low consistent individuals. 
We were also interested in assessing which new orientation individuals adopted at 
Time 2 when changing their orientation.  It appeared that the few high consistent 
individuals at Time 1 who changed their orientations became low consistent individuals of 
the same nature (i.e., high consistent pro-socials at Time 1 became low consistent pro-
socials at Time 2; high consistent pro-selfs at Time 1 became low consistent pro-selfs at 
Time 2).  A minority of low consistent individuals at Time 1 who changed their 
orientations became high consistent individuals of the same nature but a majority became 
low consistent individuals of another nature (i.e., low consistent pro-socials at Time 1 
became low consistent pro-selfs at Time 2; low consistent pro-selfs at Time 1 became low 
consistent pro-socials at Time 2). 
The results of Study 1 provided clear evidence for the assumption of Hertel & 
Fiedler (1998) that high consistent orientations reflect strong dispositions.  Indeed, the 
temporal stability of high consistent orientations was very high.  Low consistent 
orientations reflect weaker dispositions, as temporal stability was substantially lower. 
Compared to high consistent individuals, low consistent individuals chose not only less 
consistent with their orientation at Time 1, but they were also more inclined to change their 
orientation at Time 2.  This study therefore offers additional evidence that low consistent 
orientations are relatively unstable orientations and are, therefore, potentially more 
malleable by the context of the social interaction.  In Studies 2 and 3 we tested more 
directly whether the influence of the nature of social value orientation on cooperative 
behavior is much stronger for individuals with a high consistent orientation than for 
individuals with a low consistent orientation. 
Study 2: Reciprocal Cooperation 
A first setting in which we wanted to observe whether consistency of social value 
orientations could moderate the impact of the nature of social value orientations was in a 
social interaction that elicits reciprocal cooperation.  Overall, reciprocal cooperation of pro-
socials does not depend strongly on impressions of others.  Van Lange &  Semin-Goossens Consistency of Social Value Orientations  13 
(1998) showed that pro-socials reciprocated maximal cooperation of others perceived as 
honest, intelligent, or unintelligent4.  In contrast, pro-selfs only reciprocated cooperation of 
others perceived as honest.  Smeesters et al. (2002) however argued that the latter effect 
might perhaps be moderated by consistency of social value orientations, as only low 
consistent pro-selfs might reciprocate cooperation of honest others whereas high consistent 
pro-selfs might exploit them.  This possible difference in reciprocal cooperation between 
high and low consistent pro-selfs can be predicted on the basis of their differential 
susceptibility to situational influences.  High consistent pro-selfs should follow the nature 
of their social value orientation, and as a pro-self orientation is globally defined by 
maximizing own outcomes (Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989) they should be expected to 
behave non-cooperatively irrespective of partner's personality.  In contrast, low consistent 
pro-selfs are expected to behave cooperatively in this instance, because their behavior will 
at least partly be determined by a situational source, for instance from the fair norm to 
reward honest others for their cooperative behavior. 
To demonstrate the moderating impact of consistency of social value orientations, 
we therefore replicated the study of Van Lange &  Semin-Goossens (1998).  We expected 
high consistent individuals' reciprocal cooperation to be fully determined by the nature of 
their social value orientation.  High consistent pro-socials were expected to reciprocate 
cooperation of all relevant others and high consistent pro-selfs were expected to show no 
reciprocal cooperation at all.  We expected cooperative behavior of low consistent 
individuals to be determined by default norms.  In situations with maximally cooperative 
others, being fair and cooperative could be normative or desirable (cf. Van der Pligt & 
Eiser, 1984).  However, this might not be normative in all situations.  It might be the case 
that being fair and cooperative is only normative toward others described as having good 
personality characteristics.  Honesty and intelligence are good personality characteristics, 
referring respectively to being socially good and intellectually good, whereas unintelligence 
is a bad personality characteristic, referring to being intellectually bad (Rosenberg & 
Sedlak, 1972).  Moreover, honest and intelligent others generally elicit more favorable 
impressions than unintelligent others (De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999a, 1999b).  Therefore, 
the default norm might be to not reciprocate cooperative unintelligent others5 (see also De 
Bruin & Van Lange,  1999a).  As a consequence, we expected low consistent individuals to Consistency of Social Value Orientations  14 
only show reciprocal cooperation towards honest and intelligent others, but not to 
unintelligent others. 
Participants and design.  Participants were 73 undergraduates who participated for 
partial fulfillment of course requirements. The experimental design included three factors. 
These factors were social value orientation (pro-social vs. pro-self), consistency (high vs. 
low), and partner's personality (honest vs. intelligent vs. unintelligent), with the last factor 
as a within-participants variable. 
Procedure.  After participants were welcomed in the lab, each participant was seated 
in an individual cubicle. The experiment started by assessing each participant's nature and 
consistency of social  value orientation by the  Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 
1984).  Participants  were  classified  according  the  same  criteria  as  in  Study  1.  Two 
participants could not be classified because they had an orientation vector of 22.5° and two 
participants could not be classified because they had a consistency score lower than 60%. 
Of  69  classifiable  participants,  we  identified  16  high  consistent  pro-socials,  17  low 
consistent pro-socials, 18 high consistent pro-selfs and 18 low consistent pro-selfs. 
Subsequently, participants played nine independent one-trial give-some games (e.g., 
Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  In each of the nine games, each participant was asked to 
imagine that (s)he had been given four yellow chips and that the other had been given four 
blue chips.  Each own chip had a value of 10 Belgian francs for the participant, and a value 
of 20 Belgian francs for the other player.  Similarly, each chip held by the other had a value 
of 10 Belgian francs to the other, and a value of 20 Belgian francs to the participant.  The 
participant's task was to decide how many chips of his/her four chips to give to the other. 
Maximal cooperation is to give four chips and maximal non-cooperation is to give zero 
chips.  All participants understood this task well. 
We instructed participants that they would be paired with a number of others, and 
that all of these others sufficiently understood the dilemma task and had already made a 
choice in the dilemma task.  As in Van Lange & Semin-Goossens (1998), participants were Consistency of Social Value Orientations  15 
led to believe that the others also had filled out a personality questionnaire, which provided 
measures of a number of personality characteristics.  Participants were paired with nine 
others.  Three of them were relevant for the experiment.  These three others all decided to 
give away four chips.  One of these three relevant others was described as having a score in 
the upper 20% on  'honesty'.  A second relevant other was described as having a score in 
the upper 20% on  'intelligence' and a third relevant other was described as having a score 
in the lower 20% on 'intelligence'.  The six 'filler' others were described as having high or 
low scores on irrelevant dimensions (e.g., adventurous, artistic, patient).  They also made 
different choices than the three relevant others, to make participants believe that individuals 
may make choices other than giving away all four chips.  The order of presenting the others 
was randomized for each participant. 
Dependent measures.  Participants were asked how many chips to give to each of 
the others (none, one, two, three, or four). 
A 2 (social value orientation: pro-socials vs. pro-self) x 2 (consistency: high vs. 
low) x 3 (partner's personality: honest vs. intelligent vs. unintelligent) ANOVA with the 
last variable as a within-participants factor was conducted on reciprocal cooperation.  We 
obtained significant main effects of social value orientation and partner's personality.  The 
main effect of social value orientation, EO, 65) =  30.01, 12 < .0001, revealed that pro-socials 
(M =  2.87) displayed more reciprocal cooperation than pro-selfs (M =  1.70).  The main 
effect of partner's personality, E(2, 130) =  37.46, 12 < .0001, revealed that honest others (M 
=  2.78) and intelligent others (M =  2.62) elicited more reciprocal cooperation than 
unintelligent others (M =  1.47). 
These main effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between 
social value orientation, consistency and partner's personality, E(2, 130) = 3.12, P < .05. 
The means of this interaction are presented in Table 2. 
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To check our hypotheses we examined the effect of partner's personality for each 
group of individuals (i.e., high consistent pro-socials, high consistent pro-selfs, low 
consistent pro-socials, and low consistent pro-selfs).  There was no significant effect of 
partner's personality for high consistent pro-socials, .E(2,130) =  2.46, ns, whereas the effect 
was significant for low consistent pro-socials, E(2,130) ==  21.04, 12 < .0001.  Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that these participants showed lower levels of reciprocal cooperation 
towards unintelligent others (M = 1.35) than towards honest others (M= 3.41), E(l,16) = 
25.65,12< .001, and intelligent others (M =  2.94), E(l,16) =  24.40,12 < .0001.  The contrast 
of honest versus intelligent others was not significant, E(l,  16) =  1.99, ns. 
There was no significant effect of partner's personality for high consistent pro-selfs, 
..E(2, 130) < 1, ns, whereas the effect of was significant for low consistent pro-selfs, E(2,130) 
=  38.19, 12 < .0001.  These participants exhibited lower levels of reciprocal cooperation 
towards unintelligent others eM = 0.78) than towards honest others (M= 3.17), ..E(I, 16) == 
54.10,12< .0001, and intelligent others eM = 3.28), ..E(l,I7) == 39.43, 12 < .0001.  The 
contrast of honest versus intelligent others was not significant, E(I,17) < 1, ns. 
To further explore the three-way interaction between social value orientation, 
consistency, and partner's personality we conducted 2 (consistency) x 2 (partner's 
personality) ANOV  As separately for pro-socials and pro-selfs, focusing thereby on the 
contrast of (a) honest versus intelligent others, (b) honest versus unintelligent others, and 
(c) intelligent versus unintelligent others.  First, we conducted these analyses for pro-socials 
and they revealed significant interactions of consistency with the contrasts of (b) honest 
versus unintelligent others, ..E(l,65) = 8.23,12 < .01, and (c) intelligent versus unintelligent 
others, E(l,65) = 4.07, 12 < .05.  These findings indicate that differences in reciprocal 
cooperation of high consistent pro-socials versus low consistent pro-socials are greater 
when the other is perceived as unintelligent than when the other is honest or intelligent. 
Next, we conducted these analyses for pro-selfs.  We obtained significant 
interactions of consistency with the contrast of (b) honest versus unintelligent others, 
..E(l,65) = 24.79, 12 < .0001, and of (c) intelligent versus unintelligent others, E(l,65) = 
32.65,12< .0001.  These findings indicate that differences in reciprocal cooperation of high Consistency of Social Value Orientations  17 
consistent pro-selfs versus low consistent pro-selfs are greater when the other is perceived 
as either honest or intelligent than when the others is perceived as unintelligent. 
Discussion 
As expected, reciprocal cooperation of high consistent pro-socials and high 
consistent pro-selfs was not influenced by partner's personality.  High consistent pro-
socials reciprocated maximal cooperation of all others.  High consistent pro-selfs did not 
show any reciprocal cooperation.  Their general level of reciprocity was also much lower 
than that of other participants, which means that they basically behaved selfishly.  Even 
when others' cooperation could be due to their trustworthiness (honest others), high 
consistent pro-selfs took advantage of them. 
Low consistent pro-socials and low consistent pro-selfs displayed the same pattern 
of reciprocal cooperation.  They only exhibited reciprocal cooperation towards others 
described with 'good' personality characteristics (being socially or intellectually good). 
Low consistent individuals differed from high consistent individuals with the same nature 
of social value orientation.  Low consistent pro-socials differed from high consistent pro-
socials because they did not reciprocate maximal cooperation of unintelligent others.  Low 
consistent pro-selfs differed from high consistent pro-selfs because they showed reciprocal 
cooperation towards honest and intelligent others.  Cooperative behavior of low consistent 
individuals might therefore be determined strongly by default norms.  The small pretest 
(see footnote 4) we had conducted clearly indicated that this could indeed be the case.  This 
test showed that it is in general less desirable to reciprocate maximal cooperation of 
unintelligent others than maximal cooperation of honest and intelligent others. 
The fact that, unlike low consistent pro-selfs, high consistent pro-selfs did not show 
any reciprocal cooperation towards honest others (see also Smeesters et a!., 2002) qualifies 
earlier findings (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange &  Semin-Goossens, 1998), 
which allegedly demonstrated that pro-selfs tend to reciprocate cooperative behavior of 
honest others.  Apparently, high consistent pro-selfs could not resist the temptation to 
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Study 3: Forgiveness 
Study 2 demonstrated that among different social value orientations (different in 
terms of nature and consistency) there exist differences in reciprocity towards cooperative 
others varying in personality characteristics.  To further explore how individuals with 
different social value orientations deal with others varying in personality characteristics we 
conducted a study on forgiveness behavior: do individuals forgive defective behavior of 
others? 
Research on how we deal with defective behavior of others has shown that we do 
not easily forgive.  When individuals discover that others have already defected in a 
prisoner's dilemma, they are heavily inclined to act individualistically (Shafir & Tversky, 
1992; Van Lange, 2000).  Research on social value orientations has led to the conclusion 
that individuals will not easily forgive others because an altruistic motivation is virtually 
nonexistent in a prisoner's dilemma (e.g., McClintock & Liebrand, 1988).  However, 
Batson and colleagues (Batson & Ahmad, 2001; Batson & Moran, 1999) expressed doubts 
about this general conclusion and they argued that one should not look for a general 
disposition to maximize the other's outcomes.  Instead, one should search for specific 
instances in which individuals might be expected to behave cooperatively towards a 
defective other (e.g., when they feel empathy for a particular individual).  Also personality 
characteristics of the defective other might have an important impact on the decision to 
forgive him or her. 
In Study 3 we tested to which extent forgiveness was influenced by the nature and 
consistency of social value orientations.  Before participants started the game we informed 
them that because the others had to play first in the game, this could have influenced their 
behavior6. 
Forgiveness by high consistent individuals should be fully determined by the nature 
of their social value orientation.  High consistent pro-selfs can be expected to show no 
forgiveness, regardless of the personality of their opponent.  High consistent pro-socials on 
the other hand may be expected to forgive defective behavior when coming from an honest 
and intelligent other but not when coming from an unintelligent other.  They may interpret 
the defective behavior of an honest other, not as a reflection of a malevolent intention but Consistency of Social Value Orientations  19 
as cautious behavior, resulting from the fact that the other had to choose first.  As only 
individuals guided by pro-social orientations might see intelligence as potentially co-
occurring with honesty (Van Lange & Kuhlman,  1994), the defective behavior of an 
intelligent other may also not be interpreted as a reflection of a malevolent intention but 
rather as a reflection of cautious behavior. 
As in Study 2,  we expected cooperative behavior of low consistent individuals to be 
determined by default norms.  When confronted with maximally defective others, non-
cooperative behavior might be the default norm.  However, this norm might be different for 
others varying in personality.  As only individuals who follow the nature of a pro-social 
orientation might see honesty and intelligence as potentially co-occurring, the general 
perception for other individuals might be to see them as independent personality 
characteristics (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994).  If intelligence is not perceived as 
potentially co-occurring with trustworthiness, the default norm for most people might be to 
not forgive defective intelligent others.  Low consistent individuals should be influenced by 
default norms (Hertel & Fiedler, 1998) and therefore, we expected them to only forgive 
defective honest others7. 
Participants and design.  Seventy-one students participated in this study for partial 
fulfillment of course requirements. The experimental design included the same three factors 
as in Study 2. 
Procedure.  The procedure used in Study 3 was very similar to the one in Study 2. 
After participants  were  welcomed in the  lab,  they were led  to  their individual  cubicles. 
First of all,  we  assessed for  each participant's the nature and consistency of social value 
orientation  with  the  Ring  Measure  of Social  Values.  Three  participants  could  not be 
classified:  one participant had an  orientation  vector of 22.5°  and two participants had  a 
consistency score of less than 60%.  Sixty-eight participants could be classified:  18  high 
consistent pro-socials,  16 low consistent pro-socials,  16  high  consistent pro-selfs,  and  18 
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Next,  as  in Study 2 participants engaged in  nine  independent one-trial give-some 
games.  These games had to be played against nine others, three relevant and six irrelevant. 
Participants in  Study 3 received  the same information on personality characteristics  and 
cooperative behavior of these six irrelevant others as in Study 2.  The three relevant others 
were  characterized  by  the  following  personality  characteristics:  honest,  intelligent,  and 
unintelligent.  Contrary to Study 2,  these three relevant others all displayed maximal non-
cooperation  or  defection,  i.e.  they  gave  away  zero  chips.  Before  playing  these  nine 
independent games,  participants  were told that because the others knew  that they  had to 
choose first,  this  could have  influenced their choices.  Participants had  to decide for  all 
others how many chips to give to each of them. 
A 2 (social value orientation pro-social vs. pro-self) x 2 (consistency: high vs.low) 
x 3 (partner's personality: honest vs. intelligent vs. unintelligent) ANOVA with the last 
variable as a within-participants factor was conducted on forgiveness.  We obtained 
significant main effects of social value orientation and of partner's personality.  The main 
effect for social value orientation, EO,64) = 22.85, 11 < .0001, revealed that pro-socials CM 
=  1.36) forgave defective others more than pro-selfs CM =  0.61).  The main effect of 
partner's personality, E(2,128) = 46.26, 11 < .0001, revealed that honest others (M = 1.68) 
elicited more forgiveness than intelligent others CM = 0.90), who in tum elicited more 
forgiveness than unintelligent others CM =  0.37). 
These main effects  were  qualified by a  significant three-way interaction between 
social  value orientation, consistency, and partner's personality, E(2,128) = 3.45,  11  < .05. 
The means of this interaction are presented in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
To  test our hypotheses,  we examined the  effect of partner's personality for  each 
group  of individuals.  There  was  a  significant  effect  of partner's  personality  for  high Consistency of Social Value Orientations  21 
consistent  pro-socials,  E(2,128)  =  40.24,  II  < .0001.  Subsequent pairwise  comparisons 
among  high  consistent pro-socials  revealed that  honest  others  CM  = 2.67) elicited more 
forgiveness  than  unintelligent others  (M =  0.44),  E(l,17) =  48.S7,  12  < .0001.  Intelligent 
others CM =  2.28) elicited more forgiveness than unintelligent others (M =  0.44), E(l,  17) = 
31.64,  12  < .0001.  The  contrast  of honest  versus  intelligent  others  was  not significant, 
E(1,17) = 2.28, ns. 
The effect  of partner's  personality  was  also  significant  for  low  consistent pro-
socials, .E(2,128) =  22.7S, 12 < .0001. Low consistent pro-socials forgave honest others (M = 
2.00)  more  easily  than  intelligent  others  (M  =  O.SO),  E(l,lS)  =  27.00,  12  <  .001,  and 
unintelligent others  (M =  0.2S),  E(l,lS) = 31.96,  12  < .0001.  The contrast of intelligent 
versus unintelligent others was not significant, .E(l, IS) = 1.67, ns. 
The effect of partner's personality was not significant for high consistent pro-selfs, 
E(2,128) < 1, ns, whereas it was significant for low consistent pro-selfs, .E(3,192) =  13.31, II 
< .0001.  Subsequent pairwise comparisons revealed that they forgave honest others (M = 
1.67)  more  easily  than  intelligent  others  CM  = 0.39),  .E(l,17)  = 2S.47,  II  <  .0001,  and 
unintelligent others (M = 0.61), .E(l, 17) = 7.94, II < .OS.  The contrast of intelligent versus 
unintelligent others was not significant, E(l,17) < 1, ns. 
As  in  Study  2  we  further  explored  the  significant  three-way  interaction  by 
conducting 2 (consistency) x 2 (partner's personality) ANOVAs separately for pro-socials 
and pro-selfs, focusing thereby on the contrast of (a) honest versus intelligent others,  (b) 
honest  versus  unintelligent  others,  and  (c)  intelligent  versus  unintelligent  others.  The 
analyses for pro-socials revealed significant interactions of consistency with the contrasts 
of (a) honest versus intelligent others, E(l,64) =  10.32,12 < .01, and of (c) intelligent versus 
unintelligent others, E(l,64) = 18.46,12 < .0001.  These findings indicate that differences in 
forgiveness  between  high  consistent  pro-socials  and  low  consistent  pro-socials  are 
significantly  greater  when  the  other  is  perceived  as  intelligent  than  when  the  other  is 
perceived  as  honest  or unintelligent.  The  analyses  for  pro-selfs  revealed  a  significant 
interaction of consistency with the contrast of (a) honest versus intelligent, others E(l,64) = 
lS.02,  12  < .001,  and a  marginally  significant interaction  with  the contrast of (b) honest 
versus unintelligent others, .E(1,64) = 3.94, II < .06.  These findings indicate that differences 
in forgiveness between high  consistent pro-selfs  and low  consistent pro-selfs  are  greater Consistency of Social Value Orientations  22 
when the other is  perceived as  honest than  when the others  is  perceived as  intelligent or 
unintelligent. 
Discussion 
As expected, high consistent pro-socials forgave defective behavior of honest and 
intelligent others but not of unintelligent others.  High consistent pro-selfs did not show any 
forgiveness.  We assumed that forgiveness of high consistent pro-socials follows from the 
pro-social nature of their social value orientation.  Pro-socials might see intelligence or 
honesty as potentially co-occurring with each other (Van Lange &  Kuhlman, 1994). 
Participants were made aware that the others' behavior could have been influenced by the 
sequential nature of the game: the others had to choose first, knowing that this could make 
them vulnerable for exploitation when they would cooperate.  Therefore, high consistent 
pro-socials might have interpreted defective behavior of honest and intelligent others as 
cautious behavior.  Low consistent individuals differed clearly from high consistent 
individuals with the same nature of social value orientation.  Low consistent pro-socials 
differed from high consistent pro-socials because they did not forgive defective behavior of 
intelligent others.  Low consistent pro-selfs differed from high consistent pro-selfs because 
they forgave defective behavior of honest others.  Their forgiving behavior might be 
strongly determined by default norms.  A small pretest (see footnote 5) showed that it is in 
general more desirable to forgive defective behavior of honest others than defective 
behavior of intelligent and unintelligent others.  Viewed against this background, it is all 
the more remarkable that high consistent pro-socials' forgiveness towards intelligent others 
did not correspond with the default norm. 
Our results are consistent with Batson and Ahmad (2001), who suggested that there 
should be cases in which defective others can be forgiven.  They obtained evidence that 
individuals were willing to forgive a defective female, who just broke up her relationship 
and lamented about this.  Imagining the feelings of this person was enough to take her 
welfare into consideration.  Our results are somewhat stronger as we did not induce any 
empathy.  A mere report of personality characteristics might initiate forgiveness (depending 
on one's social value orientation).  This means that in some cases, individuals want to 
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be in their best interest to defect.  This study demonstrated that some individuals are more 
easily forgiven than others, and that the interaction partner's perceived personality could be 
decisive. 
General Discussion 
This paper wanted to contribute to the extensive literature on social value 
orientations.  Past research on social value orientation tended to assume that social value 
orientations are relatively stable over time (e.g., Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986). 
However, Van Lange (2000) found that the stability of orientations is somewhat lower than 
one would expect from a dispositional point of view.  In addition, Hertel & Fiedler (1998) 
argued that there might also be differences in the consistency of social value orientations 
(high vs. low) and that high consistent orientations reflect stronger dispositions than low 
consistent orientations.  This consistency factor could have an important impact on social 
interaction by moderating the impact of the nature of social value orientations. 
We explored the role of consistency of social value orientations in three separate 
studies.  In a first study, we examined the temporal stability of social value orientations. 
We demonstrated that low consistent orientations have a much lower temporal stability than 
high consistent orientations, which indicated that low consistent individuals (measured at 
Time 1) have a higher chance to adopt another orientation at Time 2 than high consistent 
individuals (measured at Time 1).  Van Lange (2000) argued that individuals might differ 
in the probability with which orientations are activated.  We believe that this probability is 
higher for low consistent individuals than for high consistent individuals.  High consistent 
individuals have developed a clear-cut decision preference that they maintain over time. 
Therefore, high consistent individuals are expected to behave almost always according to 
the nature of their social value orientation.  Situational features should not have a major 
impact on their behavior (Hertel & Fiedler, 1998).  Low consistent individuals have not 
(yet) developed a clear decision preference and the nature of their social value orientation 
might not playa strong role in unambiguous situations.  In these situations cooperative 
behavior of low consistent individuals could rather become influenced by default norms. 
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The results of these studies clearly showed that the effects of the nature of social 
value orientation on reciprocal cooperation were moderated by the consistency of social 
value orientation.  Reciprocal cooperation and forgiveness by high consistent pro-socials 
and high consistent pro-selfs were fully determined by, respectively, a pro-social 
orientation and a pro-self orientation.  Low consistent individuals behaved sometimes 
differently from high consistent individuals, although they shared a similar social value 
orientation.  This suggests that for low consistent individuals cooperative behavior is 
strongly influenced by relevant situational features (Hertel & Fiedler, 1998).  Indeed, 
cooperative behavior of low consistent individuals corresponded strongly with default 
norms about reciprocal cooperation and forgiveness towards others.  High consistent 
individuals appear to behave less in correspondence with default norms but instead more in 
correspondence with idiosyncratic norms, formed by cognitions and perceptions associated 
with the nature of their own social value orientation.  Idiosyncratic norms of high consistent 
pro-socials sometimes deviated from default norms (such as when not reciprocating 
cooperative behavior of unintelligent others or when not forgiving defective behavior of 
intelligent others).  High consistent pro-selfs apparently have only one 'self-interested' 
norm. 
The present research suggested that low consistent individuals follow the nature of 
their orientation less often than high consistent individuals.  Differences in consistency do 
not by themselves explain this observation.  Future research should search for correlates 
that could explain how consistency exerts its influence in situations.  For instance, 
differences in consistency might be associated with corresponding differences in self-
monitoring (Snyder, 1979).  For individuals who monitor and regulate their behavioral 
choices on the basis of situational information (high self-monitoring individuals), the 
impact of situational and interpersonal cues to social desirableness should be considerable. 
For these high self-monitoring individuals the correspondence between social behavior and 
underlying dispositions should be minimal.  By contrast, individuals whose behavioral 
choices are guided by relevant inner dispositions (low self-monitoring individuals) should 
be less responsive to situational norms.  For these low self-monitoring individuals the 
covariation between social behavior and underlying dispositions should be substantial. 
According to this formulation in terms of self-monitoring, high consistent individuals Consistency of Social Value Orientations  25 
would rather qualify as low self-monitors and low consistent individuals as high self-
monitors.  Other factors such as locus of control (Rotter, 1966) could also explain the 
differences between low and high consistent individuals.  Specifically, individuals with an 
internal locus of control are those whose behavior should be relatively expressive of their 
attitudes and dispositions.  In contrast, individuals with an external locus of control are 
those whose behavior should be relatively insensitive to their own dispositions but highly 
sensitive to situational cues and norms.  Many studies have shown that individuals whose 
locus of control is internal typically exert more disposition-based behavior than do 
individuals whose locus of control is external (e.g., Brown & Strickland, 1972; Kahle, 
1980).  High consistent individuals might rather have an internal locus of control, whereas 
low consistent individuals might rather have an external locus of  control. 
This paper wanted to make a contribution to the literature on social value 
orientation by demonstrating that incorporating the factor consistency of social value 
orientation does make a difference.  We doubt that anybody would have come up with our 
predictions (and findings) without considering the role of consistency.  We therefore 
suggest that future research on social value orientation will benefit by incorporating this 
factor when designing studies.  Our paper is a first step in this direction. Consistency of Social Value Orientations  26 
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Footnotes 
1 When individuals are categorized as being either pro-social or pro-self in nature, a median 
split can be performed on the consistency score within the group of pro-socials and pro-
selfs to categorize individuals as either high consistent individuals or low consistent 
individuals. 
2 At the time we conducted this experiment, the euro was not yet introduced in the countries 
of the European Union and the experiment was still conducted with the Belgian Franc as 
currency.  One euro is Bef. 40.34. 
3 In all our studies we never found differences between low consistent individualists and 
low consistent competitors and between high consistent individualists and high consistent 
competitors.  Therefore we only speak about low consistent pro-se1fs and about high 
consistent pro-selfs. 
4 As in the study of Van Lange & Semin-Goossens (1998) we dropped dishonest others 
from our study, because neither pro-socials nor pro-se1fs associate dishonesty with 
cooperation.  As they argued, we believe that comparisons of dishonest others with each of 
the three relevant others would be somewhat difficult to interpret because a dishonest other 
who exhibits maximal cooperation is more conflicting with a priori expectations of  both 
pro-socials and pro-selfs than maximal cooperation of honest, intelligent, or unintelligent 
others. 
5 We tested this assumption empirically in a short study by asking 30 students to rate (on a 
7-point Likert scale) how desirable it would be to reciprocate cooperative behavior of 
honest, intelligent, and unintelligent others.  This study revealed a significant effect of 
personality, E(2,58) = 35.56, 12 < .0001.  It appeared that it is less desirable to reciprocate 
cooperative behavior of unintelligent others CM =  3.87) than that of honest others eM = 
6.13), E(l,29) =  45.67, 12 < .0001, and intelligent others (M =  5.90), E(I,29) =  47.98, 12 < 
.0001.  The contrast of honest others versus intelligent others was not significant, E(I,29) < 
1, ns. 
6 We introduced this sentence because otherwise we believed that none of our participants 
would forgive defective behavior of the others. Consistency of Social Value Orientations  30 
7 We also tested this assumption empirically.  We asked 30 students to rate (on a 7-point 
Likert scale) how desirable it would be to forgive defective behavior of honest, intelligent, 
and unintelligent others.  We obtained a significant effect of personality, E(2,58) = 42.28, II 
< .0001. It appeared that it is more desirable to forgive defective honest others (M = 4.10) 
than defective intelligent others eM = 1.76), E(1,29) =  57.30, II < .0001, and defective 
unintelligent others (M =  1.56), E(1,29) = 51.95, II < .0001.  The contrast of intelligent 
versus unintelligent others was not significant, E(1,29) < 1, ns. Consistency of Social Value Orientations  31 
Table 1. 
Classification of Social Value Orientations at Time 2 as a Function of Time 1 
Social Value Orientation at Time 2 
Social Value  High  Low  High  Low  Not 
Orientation at  consistent  consistent  consistent  consistent  classified 
Time 1  pro-social  pro-social  pro-self  pro-self  at Time 2 
High 
consistent pro- 90.1% (64)  8.4% (6)  0% (0)  0% (0)  1.4% (1) 
social (n=71) 
Low 
consistent pro- 9.2% (6)  47.7% (31)  0% (0)  29.2% (19)  13.8% (9) 
social (n=65) 
High 
consistent pro- 0% (0)  1.5% (1)  84.8% (56)  6% (4)  7.6% (5) 
self (n=66) 
Low 
consistent pro- 0% (0)  36.1% (22)  6.6% (4)  52.4% (32)  4.9% (3) 
self (n=61) Consistency of Social Value Orientations  32 
Table 2. 
Reciprocal Cooperation towards Cooperative Others 
Personality characteristic 
Social value  Honest  Intelligent  Unintelligent 
orientation 
High consistent  3.44\  3.37\  2.75a] 
pro-social 
Low consistent  3.41\  2.94\ 
b 
1.35  2 
pro-social 
High consistent  b 
1.11  ] 
b 
0.89  ] 
b 
1.00  ] 
pro-self 
Low consistent  3.17a]  3.28\ 
b 
0.78  2 
pro-self 
Note.  Within columns, means that do not share a common superscript differ significantly 
ill < .05).  Within rows, means that do not share a common subscript differ significantly (n 
< .05). Consistency of Social Value Orientations  33 
Table 3. 
Forgiveness towards Defective Others 
Personality characteristic 
Social value  Honest  Intelligent  Unintelligent 
orientation 
High consistent  2.67al  2.28\  0.44a2 
pro-social 
Low consistent  b 
2.001 
b 
0.502  0.2Sa2 
pro-social 
High consistent  0.37cI 
b 
0.44 1  0.19al 
pro-self 
Low consistent  b 
1.67 1 
b 
0.392  0.61a2 
pro-self 
Note.  Within columns, means that do not share a common superscript differ significantly 
(Q < .05).  Within rows, means that do not share a common subscript differ significantly C!2 
< .05).2 